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Determination of stable coalitions in a CO2
emission game
M. Elena Sa´iz 1 , Eligius M.T. Hendrix, Niels J. Olieman a
aOperations Research and Logistics Group, Wageningen University, 6706 KN
Wageningen, The Netherlands
Abstract
This paper presents an implementable description of a game on Kyoto protocol
coalition formation. Concepts from literature about the so-calledCO2 emission game
where stability of coalition structures in an Open Membership Game and Exclusive
Membership Game are applied, are translated into a new notation for specifying
the stability and facilitating the implementation into computer coding. We consider
multiple coalitions that groups of world regions can join. Implementation aspects
are outlined and results are shown.
Key words: Environment, Game theory, Coalition formation, Stability,
Implementation
1 Introduction
A consensus seems to appear in the world on the existence of the greenhouse
effect. Using financial means to abate greenhouse gas emissions by individual
countries looks inefficient from a cost perspective, as some countries can abate
more cheaply than others. This gives an economic drive to co-operate in the
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. The real co-operation of countries and
regions, such as observed in the Kyoto protocol, is merely a political question.
Concepts from economy and game theory provide means of analyses to see
whether at least economic incentives exist to form coalitions. Extensive litera-
ture on coalition formation of economic coalitions, such as Bloch, [1], [2], Ray
and Vohra [5], [11] and Yi [13], [14], describe formation of multiple coalitions
and examine the equilibrium number and size of coalitions. However, each of
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the authors adopts a different notion of the stability of a coalition structure.
A difference between the rules of coalition formation lies in what can happen
to the membership of a coalition once it has been formed: Can an existing
coalition break apart, admit new members, or merge with other coalitions?
Different rules of coalition formation lead to different predictions about stable
coalition structures.
Despite the amount of papers on this topic, few of them showed implemented
results. To derive analytical results, often players are assumed to be identical;
this is called a symmetric game. Application in empirical studies where players
are probably heterogeneous, is rare. Recently, the idea has been applied to
get a feeling for incentives of coalition formation around the reduction of
the emission of greenhouse gasses (the so-called Kyoto discussions). Finus and
Eykmans [4] show a study where the world has been divided into 6 regions and
the tendency to co-operate is analysed using estimated payoff models. As will
be described, determination of stability of all (multiple) coalition structures
implies comparing some 200 possible structures when there are 6 players. One
could check 200 structures by hand. Their study is elaborated and extended by
Finus e.a. [8] using new estimates of the payoff function for 12 world regions
and algorithms developed in co-operation with the authors of the current
paper. In [8] only cartels (one coalition is possible) are checked, leading to
some 4000 possible coalitions. The real challenge is to determine all (multiple)
coalition structures, which for 12 regions counts up to more than 4 million.
This requires exact implementable formulations of the problem and efficient
data handling.
The current paper describes this development and facilitates studying multi-
ple coalition formation among players in the Kyoto protocol, implement it and
obtain so-called stable coalition structures. Particular attention is paid to the
analysis of the stability under different membership rules. The case of Finus
and Eykmans [4], is used for validation purposes to check the final implemen-
tation. Results of applying the suggested approach to the case described in
[8], gave new insight to economic researchers about economic incentives for
coalition formation with respect to CO2 emission reduction.
This paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we apply a new notation to
introduce the concept of neighbourhood and definitions of stability in the open
membership game and the exclusive membership game with unanimity and
majority vote. In section 3 we discuss the implementation used. In section 4
the result of different cases is shown.
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2 Multiple Coalition Game
2.1 Game
2 The Kyoto protocol game, as introduced in [8], is a two-level game. The
players are world regions each with a particular benefit and cost structure on
the abatement of CO2 emissions. On the first level they decide simultaneously
on their membership in a coalition; on the second level coalitions choose their
abatement strategies. This choice depends on the coalition structure appearing
on the first level.
Let J be the set of regions and j ∈ J represent the region index. Let qj be
the individual abatement of region j, Bj(·) the benefits function from global
abatement (
∑n
r=1 qr) and ACj(·) the abatement costs function from individual
abatement qj (see [8] for details). The abatement decision on the second level
is based on the following payoff function:
ϕj(q) = Bj(
n∑
r=1
qr)− ACj(qj) (1)
The Cartel Game (see e.g. [8]) assumes the existence of at most one coalition.
Regions of the coalition are called signatories and all other regions non partic-
ipating are called singletons or non-signatories. On the first level of this game,
two membership strategies are available to regions:
• strategy σj = 0: means region j is a non-signatory,
• strategy σj = 1: means region j is a signatory
In the Multiple Coalition Game regions on the the first level can either decide
to be member of a non-trivial coalition, signatories, or can form a singleton
coalition, non-signatories. In this game several coalitions may exist and regions
can choose which coalition to join. The Multiple Coalition Game has a larger
membership strategy set than the Cartel Game.
We introduce formally the concept of a coalition structure c = {κ1, . . . , κm}
as a collection of coalitions κi of one or more regions, with m the total number
of coalitions in coalition structure c. In other words, a coalition structure
c = {κ1, . . . , κm} is a partition of the set of regions, J , where a particular
coalition is denoted by κi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, κi ∩ κj = ∅ for all i 6= j, ∪κi = J .
2 Some general remarks about syntax conventions in this paper: An underscore
under a variable depicts a vector, such as x. The ith element of the vector x is
denoted as xi.
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A coalition with only one region j, |κj| = 1, is called a singleton and the
coalition where all regions participate, κ1 = J , is called theGrand Coalition.
The two level game is defined as follows:
• Region j ∈ J = {1, . . . , n} decides in which coalition κi to participate
(i ∈ {1, . . . ,m})
• In the Emission Abatement game, now the coalitions are considered as a set
of regions who decide on their common abatement, such that the aggregate
payoff (we will call welfare) of a coalition (outcome) is maximized.
The input for level 2 is defined by coalition structure c = {κ1, . . . , κm}. The
welfare functions of level 2 for each coalition κi in the coalition structure c are
defined by
welci (q) =
∑
j∈κi
ϕj(q)
where ϕj(q) is the individual payoff for player (world region)j
with abatement vector q
The optimal abatement level q∗(c) depending on structure c leads to an output
of level 2 being a welfare vector that can be translated into values of the payoffs
of the individual world regions j ∈ J possibly after applying transfers between
the members of a coalition. Actually, the payoff vector only depends on the
output c of level 1 with elements Πj(c) = ϕj(q
∗(c)):
Π(c) = vector of payoff values following from level 2 under coalition structure c
Πj(c) = ϕj(q
∗(c)) payoff of region j based on optimal abatement vector q∗(c)
Because the strategy in the second stage is fixed, given a coalition structure c
the entire coalition formation game reduces to one single stage.
We now introduce the so-called “Eyckmans notation”, see [4], for a coalition
structure. The coalition structure in this notation is expressed as a string of
numbers indicating the number of the coalition, a region belongs to. A ”1”
indicates that a region is part of coalition “1”; a “2” indicates that a region
is part of the coalition “2”; and so on until the maximum number of possible
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coalitions “m = n”. For example for six regions:
c = [1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 2]⇒ c = {{1}, {2, 3, 6}, {4}, {5}} with
|κ1| = 1, κ1 = {1},
|κ2| = 3, κ2 = {2, 3, 6}
|κ3| = 1, κ3 = {4}
|κ4| = 1, κ4 = {5}
represents: region j = 1 called “1” is a singleton, κ1 and |κ1| = 1, regions
j = 2, 3, 6 form a coalition called “2”, κ2 and |κ2| = 3, and regions j = 4 and
j = 5, called “3” and “4” respectively, κ3, κ4; |κ3| = 1, |κ4| = 1, are singletons.
In this notation, the same coalition can be represented by:
c = [2, 1, 1, 3, 4, 1]
The idea is to translate alternative representations by ordering via an algo-
rithmic rule: for j = 1, . . . , n if a region is not in an existing coalition, give it
coalition number i := i+ 1.
The Grand Coalition, c = {κ1}, |κ1| = n, in vector notation is c = [1, 1, . . . , 1]
and the coalition structure with only singleton members, c = {κ1, κ2, . . . , κn},
|κj| = 1, for all j, is c = [1, 2, . . . , n].
In this paper we use both notations; that of subsets and of strings. The string
notation allows defining the so-called “neighbourhoods” that can be used in
the implementation.
The total number L of all possible coalition structures is not known analyt-
ically, but can be derived numerically. A unique index function 1, . . . , L to
number the coalition structures is not straightforward either. However, the
generated coalition structures in the (ordered) Eyckmans notation defines an
ordered list of numbers consisting of n digits. This gives the possibility to find
a particular structure from a list by bisection in (average) logL steps. The
number of multiple coalition structures generated by an algorithm is:
n : 6 7 8 9 10 12
L : 203 877 4140 21147 115975 4213597
One can determine all optimal payoff values Πj(cl) for all possible coalition
structures cl, l = 1, . . . , L. As a result, we obtain a large L × n payoff ma-
trix Π, of optimal payoff values for every individual region j when coalition
structure l applies. The matrix can be used to study decisions on level 1.
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2.2 Neighbourhood of Coalition Structures
We introduce some new concepts that are useful in the study of stability of
coalition structures. In the Cartel Game (single coalition game) a region j has
only one alternative action, either leave or join the coalition. In the multiple
coalition game, inside a coalition structure cl = {κ1, . . . , κml}, each region j
usually has more than one alternative:
Let region j be a member of a non-singleton coalition κi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,ml} in
the coalition structure cl. Region j has two possible alternatives: one alterna-
tive is to leave coalition κi to become a singleton forming another coalition,
κml+1, |κml+1| = 1; the other alternative is to leave coalition κi to join another
coalition κt, t ∈ {1, . . . ,ml}\{i}.
Now, suppose j forms a singleton coalition by itself κi, |κi| = 1. Region j has
“only” one alternative: to join another coalition κt, t ∈ {1, . . . ,ml}\{i}.
The number of possible alternatives depends on the number of different coali-
tions in the coalition structure. If there is more than one coalition κt, t ∈
{1, . . . ,ml} in the coalition structure cl, then a region can join any other
coalition except its current coalition, i.e. ml − 1 coalitions (ml possibilities if
it is a singleton).
The players of the game on level 1 are the world regions j = 1, . . . , n. Given
a coalition structure cl they can decide (strategy) on leaving a coalition and
entering another. Here the stability definitions of the following section play a
role. It is important to note that the deviation of one region while the others
do not change strategy, leads to a so-called neighbour coalition structure.
For the check of stability we need all the neighbours of cl. The exact number of
neighbours is not easy to identify in the multiple coalition game, in contrast
to the cartel formation game. Let cl be a coalition structure, k(j) be the
number of the coalition which j belongs to and let κk(j) be that coalition.
The neighbour coalition structures are represented by c
neig(j,t)
l , j ∈ J , t ∈ νlj,
with νlj the possible deviation index set of region j in structure cl defined as
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follows:
If coalition κk(j) is formed by a singleton region j, |κk(j)| = 1, the neighbours
generated by region j are defined by the possible alternatives in the strategy
set:
νlj = {1, 2, . . . ,ml}\{k(j)} and |νlj| = ml − 1 (2a)
If j is non-singleton, |κk(j)| > 1, the possible alternatives in the strategy set are
given by:
νlj = {1, 2, . . . ,ml + 1}\{k(j)} and |νlj| = ml (2b)
as j can also choose to proceed alone.
Note that each neighbour of the Grand Coalition corresponds to a Cartel
Coalition Structure: a coalition formed by n − 1 regions and only one non-
signatory region, a singleton.
Example:
Let cl = [1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2] a coalition structure in the Eyckmans
notation.
For non-singleton region 1 the possible deviation index set is:
k(1) = 1, νl1 = {2, 3, 4, 5}
and corresponding neighbour coalition structures are:
cneig(1,2) = [2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2] = [1, 2, 1, 1, 3, 4, 3, 3, 1, 2, 2, 1]
cneig(1,3) = [3, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2] = [1, 2, 3, 3, 1, 4, 1, 1, 3, 2, 2, 3]
cneig(1,4) = [4, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2] = [1, 2, 3, 3, 4, 1, 4, 4, 3, 2, 2, 3]
cneig(1,5) = [5, 1, 2, 2, 3, 4, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2] =
↑
[1, 2, 3, 3, 4, 5, 4, 4, 3, 2, 2, 3]
which after
translating
becomes
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For singleton region 6 the possible deviation index set is:
k(6) = 4, νl6 = {1, 2, 3}
and corresponding neighbour coalition structures are:
cneig(6,1) = [1, 1, 2, 2, 3,1, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2]
cneig(6,2) = [1, 1, 2, 2, 3,2, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2]
cneig(6,3) = [1, 1, 2, 2, 3,3, 3, 3, 2, 1, 1, 2]
which do not require translation.
The total neighbourhood of a structure is defined by all the alternatives of
all world regions. Due to overlap of (translated) neighbours, we only have an
upper bound of the total number of neighbours of cl; it is not bigger than∑
j |νlj|
From now on we leave out the sub-index l and we only write c to denote a
coalition structure, m for the total number of coalitions in c and νj for the
deviation index set of a region j.
2.3 Stability definition
In a single coalition game (Cartel Game), a distinction can be made between
internally and externally stable (see [8], [10]). Internally stable means that
there is no region in the coalition with the incentive to leave to become a
singleton. Externally stable means, that there is no singleton region with the
incentive to enter the coalition. In the Multiple Coalition Game we have more
than one coalition and we have to be more careful defining stability.
We use the concept of Inter-Coalition stability (see [3]). This concept means
for structure c∗ that there is no region belonging to a coalition κk ∈ c∗ which
would be better off by leaving the coalition to join another non-singleton
coalition κt ∈ c∗.
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Formally, the definition of stability is:
Definition 1 Stability in a Multiple Coalition Game:
• Internal Stability: no cooperating region j would be better off by leaving
coalition κk ∈ c∗ to form a singleton κm+1;
• External Stability: no singleton region j would be better off by joining
any coalition κt ∈ c∗, t ∈ νj;
• Inter-coalition Stability: no region belonging to κk ∈ c∗, |κk| > 1, would
be better off by leaving κk to join another coalition κt ∈ c∗.
Note the following:
• A coalition structure without singletons is externally stable.
• In the definition of external stability we include the possibility that a sin-
gleton can join another singleton, that is, coalition κt ∈ c∗, t ∈ νj in the
definition above can be a coalition with only one region.
• In the definition of inter-coalition stability we assume that coalition κk ∈ c∗
has more than one region, that is, it is not a singleton.
Before proceeding to the stability check we summarise the notation used:
• c: coalition structure in set notation; c in vector (Eyckmans) notation;
• J = {1, . . . , n}: set of world regions;
• k(j): current coalition number of world region j;
• m: number of coalitions in coalition structure c.
• κi: coalition inside coalition structure c with one or more members, i ∈
{1, . . . ,m}, m ≤ n;
• νj: set of alternative strategies of world region j in structure c;
Consider a situation with the following existing coalition.
c∗ = [1, 1, 1
↑
region 3
, 1, 2, 3, 2, 4, 1, 2, 3, 5]
A region, for instance region three, has six possible strategies and deviation
set: v3 = {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} . The first possible strategy is to stay in its current
coalition 1; the strategies two to five are to leave the current coalition and
join coalition number i, i ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5} which is a subset of v3; the last possible
strategy, number six, is to leave the current coalition and form a coalition
number 6 to become a singleton; depending on what is the most favorable
option. In the situation that none of the 12 regions in c∗ has the incentive
to change the current situation, the coalition structure is considered to be
in Nash equilibrium. This implies the following criterion for determining the
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stability of a coalition:
if the payoff for each region in the current situation is higher than the payoff
in all of the neighbour alternatives, then coalition structure c∗ is stable.
This means, for instance, that the coalition structure
c∗ = [1, 1, 1, 2, 3, 2, 4, 1, 2, 3, 5]
has to be compared with the following neighbours of c∗ with respect to region
j = 3
• cneig(3,2) = [1, 1, 2, 2, 3, 2, 4, 1, 2, 3, 5]
region 3 enters a coalition called 2
• cneig(3,3) = [1, 1, 3, 2, 3, 2, 4, 1, 2, 3, 5]
region 3 enters a coalition called 3
• cneig(3,4) = [1, 1, 4, 2, 3, 2, 4, 1, 2, 3, 5]
region 3 enters a coalition called 4
• cneig(3,5) = [1, 1, 5, 2, 3, 2, 4, 1, 2, 3, 5]
region 3 enters a coalition called 5(=m)
• cneig(3,6) = [1, 1, 6, 2, 3, 2, 4, 1, 2, 3, 5]
region 3 forms a singleton coalition called 6(=m+1)
The following can happen:
• If option cneig(3,t), for all t ∈ v3, does not result into a higher payoff for
region 3, then region 3 will not enter coalition t
There is no incentive to change anything as far as region 3 is concerned. The
same applies to other regions, where the region has possibly a different number
of alternatives. If for each other region the departure from the coalition will
not result in a higher payoff, then it will not leave the coalition. Therefore:
if in all of these cases the alternative of the region does not give an expected
improvement, no action will be taken and thus coalition structure c∗ is stable.
2.3.1 Open membership stability:
The term Open Membership is used to indicate that for the current regions of
coalition κt, any other region is allowed to enter it.
To check the stability of c∗ = {κ1, . . . , κm} let t ∈ νj be an index indicating
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the possible coalitions that j can join and cneig(j,t), the possible neighbour
coalition structure arising from coalition structure c∗ as a result of region
j changing its status and forming coalition t (singleton) or joining another
coalition t.
Consider region j changing its strategy from k(j), (κk(j)), to t ∈ νj, (κt). This
results into neighbour coalition structure:
(1) If j is a singleton
cneig(j,t) = {κ1, κ2, . . . , κt ∪ {j}, . . . , κm−1}
(2) If j is a non-singleton
• either join other coalition κt
cneig(j,t) = {κ1, κ2, . . . , κt ∪ {j}, . . . , κk(j)\{j}, . . . , κm}
• or form a singleton κm+1
cneig(j,t) = {κ1, κ2, . . . , κt, . . . , κk(j)\{j}, . . . , κm+1}
with
κm+1 = {j}
Therefore, a coalition structure (c∗) is defined:
internally stable in the open membership game if:
Πj(c
∗) ≥ Πj(cneig(j,m+1))
for all j with |κk(j)| > 1
(3)
externally stable in the open membership game if:
Πj(c
∗) ≥ Πj(cneig(j,t))
for t ∈ νj and j with |κk(j)| = 1
(4)
inter-coalitionally stable in the open membership game if:
Πj(c
∗) ≥ Πj(cneig(j,t))
for j with |κk(j)| > 1,
t ∈ νj\{m+ 1} with |κt| ≥ 1
(5)
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2.3.2 Exclusive membership stability:
The exclusive membership in the single coalition game (Cartel Game) implies
there is an additional condition in external stability: a non-coalition region is
only allowed to join the existing coalition if the payoff for the existing coalition
members will not decrease. Specifically one can consider two types of voting
rules:
(1) Majority Voting : if a region has an incentive to join coalition κt we have
to check if the current members are better or worse off. If more than 50%
are in favor of accession, then the candidate is accepted and the original
coalition structure is not stable. We assume that if 1 is in favor and 1
against then accession is not accepted.
(2) Unanimity Voting : only if all coalition members are in favor of accession,
then the candidate is allowed to enter. That is, if there is one region
against (veto), then accession is not possible.
In the multiple coalition game this rule differs depending on if we are testing
the external stability or the inter-coalition stability. Consider region j wants
to change its strategy from k(j) to t ∈ νj
• Internal Stability : in the exclusive membership game is still defined by 3.
• External Stability : Region j forms a singleton coalition by itself κk(j) = 1. If
there is any region p in κt (unanimity) such that its payoff decreases, then
region j is not allowed to join coalition κt.
• Inter-coalition Stability : Region j is a region of a non-trivial coalition,
|κk(j)| > 1. If there is any region p in κt (unanimity) such that its payoff
decreases, then region j is not allowed to join coalition κt.
The concept of majority voting requires introduction of a new binary variable
yes/no symbol, δp, that tell us whether the current region in a neighbour
coalition structure is against or in favor of another region entering:
For p ∈ κt :
 δp = 1 , if Πp(c
∗) > Πp(cneig(j,t)) (against)
δp = 0 otherwise.
(6)
and the majority is against when:
∑
p∈κt δp ≥ |κt|/2
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More specifically, a coalition Structure c∗ is defined externally or inter-coalitionally
stable in the exclusive membership game if
Externally Stable Inter-coalitionally Stable
if for all j with |κk(j)| = 1, t ∈ νj if for all j with |κk(j)| > 1, t ∈ νj
Πj(c∗) ≥ Πj(cneig(j,t))
Majority OR
Voting Πj(c∗) < Πj(cneig(j,t))
Rule and
∑
p∈κt δp ≥ |κt|/2
OR
Unanimity Πj(c∗) < Πj(cneig(j,t))
Voting and there exists p in κt such that
Rule Πp(c∗) > Πp(cneig(j,t))
The challenge is now to create a procedure to find for the first level game, where
coalition formation takes place, so-called Nash equilibria i.e. stable coalition
structures. Consequently, on the level of the abatement decisions, for each
structure the equilibrium of that level has to be determined. Such a procedure
is outlined in the next section.
3 Implementation of the algorithm and non stability indicators
We have implemented an algorithm for finding equilibria of the multiple coali-
tion game in MATLAB. As a consequence of the large number of coalition
structures we must consider a big matrix with all necessary data to test stable
coalition structures. For each coalition structure we determine:
• index for coalition structure.
• coalition structure.
• payoff vector for each region of coalition structure.
• three indicators 0-1 for internal, inter-coalition and external stability of the
coalition structure (0 = non-stable; 1 = stable).
• sum of differences between payoffs for all regions in coalition structure in
case of non-stability (internal, inter-coalition and external).
To test stability, all possible neighbours of current coalition structure, c∗, are
considered and the payoff for each region for each neighbourhood cneig(j,t) (one
at a time) is looked up. Subsequently, we compare the differences between the
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payoff for region j, j ∈ J , in the current coalition structure against its payoff
in its neighboring coalition structure, i.e.:
∆j,t = Πj(c
∗)− Πj(cneig(j,t)) (7)
We sum this quantity in cases of non-stability (negative) for all regions in
each coalition structure for each indicator of stability: internal, inter-coalition
and external, showing how far this coalition structure is from becoming inter-
nally, inter-coalitionally or externally stable. These are called Non-Stability
Indicators and are defined as follows:
Non-stability indicators : ∆pc∗ = −
∑
j
∑
t∈νj
[
Πj(c
∗)− Πj(cneig(j,t))
]−
where x− = max(0,−x) only counts negative deviations. Index p = 1, 2, 3
denotes internal (1), inter-coalition (2) and external (3) stability deviation for
each coalition structure.
Furthermore, by adding the three indicators one gets a picture of the total
deviation from stability of the coalition structures. This “global indicator” is:
∆l =
3∑
p=1
∆pcl (8)
It gives the total amount of means necessary to make a coalition structure
stable by compensating the regions for not changing their strategy. Finding
stable structures means to maximise equation (8) over the coalition structures
since the optimal value will be 0 and corresponds to a Nash equilibrium, i.e.
max
l
∆l
The implementation of the algorithm contains the following ingredients:
STEP 1 Settings : Region specific parameter values, used in calculation of
the payoffs. In the case of Finus et al., [8], such parameters concern data
about benefits, costs, abatement, payoff, emissions and concentration:
• Share of global benefits vector
• Abatement cost parameters
• Reference year CO2 emission data in Gtons carbon in 2010 (see [8])
14
STEP 2 Generate: generate all possible coalition structures in vector no-
tation and save in matrix structure. In addition we save a special index
indicating the Eyckmans code.
STEP 3 Abatement : calculate the optimal payoff for all possible coalition
structures. The strategies are continuous decisions, q (see [8] for details), on
abatement, reduction of emissions from a maximum level emaxj , 0 ≤ qj ≤
emaxj . The payoff for an individual region j in a coalition structure c is:
ϕj(q) = Bj(
n∑
r=1
qr)− ACj(qj) (9)
and depends on:
• Bj(∑nr qr): benefits from global abatement. Benefits from global abate-
ment are derived from reduced environmental damages caused by green-
house gas emissions. Bj(·) is increasing (dBj/dq > 0) and either strictly
concave (d2Bj/(dq)
2 < 0) or linear (d2Bj/(dq)
2 = 0) function in the sum
of all abatement.
• ACj(qj): abatement cost from abatement in region j, which is increasing
(dACj/dqj > 0) in the abatement and (strictly) convex (d
2ACj/(dqj)
2 >
0).
The payoff ϕj of region j and thus the aggregate welfare wel
c
i of coalition i in
coalition structure c, not only depends on its own strategy but also on those
in other world regions. The game may now be seen as a positive externality
game: payoff in region j increases with abatement in region p. After the
players of the game have been identified one can try to find the optimal
abatement levels from the game-theoretic concept that every coalition is
maximising its payoff,
max
qj
weli(q), j ∈ κi, i = 1, . . . ,m
where weli(q) =
∑
j∈κi ϕj(q). The optimum is found by solving the set of
equalities determined by the first order conditions:
∂weli(q)
∂qj
= 0 j ∈ κi ,
if the optimum is interior with respect to 0 ≤ qj ≤ emaxj for i = 1, . . .m.
Regions belonging to the same coalition maximize the aggregate welfare of
their coalition. The equilibrium abatement strategy vector q∗ for coalition
structure c is derived as a Nash equilibrium between coalitions. Here we
want to specify that in our cases we take as the region payoff simply the
payoff that an individual region gets when carrying out the common optimal
abatement strategy q∗. We understand that it is more realistic to assume
transfers within coalitions, but our focus is mainly on the implementation
and we keep the model as simple as possible. The outcome of this step
consists of an abatement vector q and a payoff matrix Π which contains
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all individual payoffs Πj for regionj in all possible payoff vectors for the
coalition structures, cl:
Π =

Π1
Π2
. . .
ΠL

=

Π1(c1) . . . Πj(c1) . . . Πn(c1)
Π1(c2) . . . Πj(c2) . . . Πn(c2)
. . .
Π1(cL) . . . Πj(cL) . . . Πn(cL)

STEP 4 Stability : main procedure. Now we proceed to look for those coali-
tions which are stable, that is, internal, inter-coalition and externally stable.
The new notation introduced in the last sections helps us in the implementa-
tion of this procedure. We use the same formulas that have been introduced
to determine the stability of each coalition structure.
4 Cases
In this section results for the world regions of the Kyoto protocol are shown. We
apply majority and unanimity games. We elaborate a 6 region case reported
by Finus and Eyckmans in [4]. For the illustration we show a 12 region case
based on Olieman [10] which requires the determination of more than 4 mil-
lions coalition structures. We get stable coalition structures in both games. In
addition, if there is no stable coalition structure we evaluate the non-stability
indicators and we also report the least non-stable coalition structure, i.e., those
that are most near to stability (internal, external and inter-coalition). If there
are stable coalition structures, all have a non-stability indicator value of zero.
The source of the data is due to Finus and Altamirano-Cabrera, [7], and
Dellink et.a. [6]. They set up an empirical model, the so-called STAbility of
COalition model, STACO. For emissions in 2010 they choose the value of the
DICE model (see [9]), which amounts to 11.96 gigatons CO2. Olieman in [10]
shows a 12 region case and looks for a stable cartel. The data of that study are
used to derive a 6, 8 and 10 region case and the results are reported in [12].
The regions distinguished in these studies are: USA (USA), Japan (JPN), Eu-
ropean Union (EEC), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern European coun-
tries (EET), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX),
China (CHN), India (IND), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA)
and “rest of the world” (ROW) (see [8]).
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4.1 Parameters of the payoff function
With respect to the parameter values of the payoff function, the analysis of
Finus and Altamirano-Cabrera, [7] is used. It starts in 2010 and covers a time
period of 100 years in order to capture the long-run effects of the global warm-
ing problem. Benefits are expressed in the form of discounted reduced damages
due to accumulated abatement over the entire period, q =
∑2110
t=2011 qt. They
come to B(q) = 37.40q where allocation of global benefits from reduced envi-
ronmental damages to the various world regions is based on the assumption:
Bj(q) = sjB(q) (10)
where sj is the share of region j.
For the Abatement Cost Function, they assume an annual abatement cost
function of the shape:
ACjt(qjt) =
1
3
αj(qjt)
3 +
1
2
βj(qjt)
2
where simply qjt is taken as qj/100 assuming stationary strategies (qj,2011 =
. . . = qj,2110). In the model, abatement means emission reduction with respect
to (business-as-usual-scenario)-emissions. A total initial emission of 11.96 gi-
gatons is allocated to the 12 regions. The total abatement cost for region j is
the discounted sum over t = 2011, . . . , 2110 leading to
ACj(qj) = 43.1ACjt(qjt) (11)
Table 1 shows parameter values about:
• Share of total of Emissions in 2010 in Gigatons, Ej,2010
• Share of Global Benefits, sj. The sum is equal to 1.
• Abatement cost parameter αj
• Abatement cost parameter βj
that are used in the 12 region case.
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Table 1
Parameters of STACO model (12 region) ACj and Bj (equations 10, 11)
Region (j) Ej,2010 (Gigatons) sj αj βj
1 USA 2.416 0.2263 0.0005 0.00398
2 JPN 0.557 0.1725 0.0155 0.18160
3 EEC 1.399 0.236 0.0024 0.01503
4 OOE 0.621 0.0345 0.0083 0
5 EET 0.519 0.013 0.0079 0.00486
6 FSU 1.003 0.0675 0.0023 0.00042
7 EEX 1.219 0.030 0.0032 0.03029
8 CHN 2.356 0.062 0.00007 0.00239
9 IND 0.639 0.050 0.0015 0.00787
10 DAE 0.405 0.0249 0.0047 0.03774
11 BRA 0.128 0.0153 0.5612 0.84974
12 ROW 0.698 0.068 0.0021 0.00805
WORLD
∑
=11.96
∑
sj=1
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4.2 12 region case
A Fortran implementation of the algorithm generates the 4.213.597 possible
coalition structures and performs the stability checks as outlined on section
2.3. Table 2 depicts the number of stable structures classified towards the
different definitions of stability. Only in the exclusive membership game where
members can apply a veto for other regions not to enter, stable structures
appear.
Table 2
Results 12 region case. STACO Model
OPENM EXMMAJ EXMUNAN
Stable 0 0 8
Internally Stable 98 98 98
Intercoalitionally Stable 7 1.834.950 3.922.082
Externally Stable 988.476 1.619.763 2.681.807
The stable coalition structures and their corresponding monetary values are
listed in table 3 and are interpreted further by economists. The results on
payoff, called welfare here, can be used to analyse the economic incentive for
coalitions to appear. For instance one can observe that USA and Japan are not
a member of any stable coalition and for Brazil the incentive to co-operate is
bigger. In reality there may be many other reasons for coalitions to be formed.
The model only generates economic sound possibilities for coalition formation.
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Table 3
Stable Coalition Structures 12 region case. STACO Model. Unanimity Game
Coalitions Coalitions
Non-singleton Coalition {OOE; IND; BRA} {FSU; ROW} {EEX; CHN}
Welfare 86 + 122 + 40 164 + 165 75 + 130
Singleton Coalitions USA JPN EEC EET DAE
Welfare 536 447 590 34 65
World 2.452
Non-singleton Coalition {FSU; BRA; ROW} {OOE; IND} {EEX; CHN}
Welfare 162 + 39 + 163 87 + 124 75 + 130
Singleton Coalitions USA JPN EEC EET DAE
Welfare 536 447 590 34 65
World 2.451
Non-singleton Coalition {OOE; IND; BRA} {FSU; ROW} {CHN; DAE}
Welfare 84 + 120 + 39 161 + 163 131 + 61
Singleton Coalitions USA JPN EEC EET EEX
Welfare 527 440 581 33 76
World 2.415
Non-singleton Coalition {FSU; BRA; ROW} {OOE; IND} {CHN; DAE}
Welfare 159 + 39 + 160 85 + 122 131 + 61
Singleton Coalitions USA JPN EEC EET EEX
Welfare 527 440 581 33 76
World 2.414
Non-singleton Coalition {OOE; IND; BRA} {FSU; ROW} {EEX; DAE}
Welfare 79 + 112 + 37 150 + 151 71 + 59
Singleton Coalitions USA JPN EEC EET CHN
Welfare 489 411 542 31 133
World 2.263
Non-singleton Coalition {FSU; BRA; ROW} {EEX; DAE} {OOE; IND}
Welfare 148 + 36 + 149 71 + 59 80 + 114
Singleton Coalitions USA JPN EEC EET CHN
Welfare 489 411 542 31 133
World 2.262
Non-singleton Coalition {FSU; BRA; ROW} {OOE; DAE} {EEX; IND}
Welfare 148 + 36 + 149 81 + 58 69 + 114
Singleton Coalitions USA JPN EEC EET CHN
Welfare 489 411 541 31 133
World 2.261
Non-singleton Coalition {FSU; BRA; ROW} {OOE; EEX} {IND; DAE}
Welfare 147 + 36 +149 80 + 70 114 + 58
Singleton Coalitions USA JPN EEC EET CHN
Welfare 488 410 540 31 132
World 2.255
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4.3 Finus-Eyckmans data
Michael Finus and Johan Eyckmans present in [4] results for a six region
case and obtain stable coalition structures in the exclusive membership game.
They obtain results for a case where coalition members share the additional
benefits, due to so called transfers and a case where the transfers are absent
as in the 12 region case. With their payoff data set and region set (USA,
JPN, EU (EEC), CHN, FSU, ROW) and our implementation we get the same
stable coalition structures in the open membership game and the exclusive
membership game with and without transfers. The tables A.1, A.2 and A.3,
presented in appendix A, show the stable coalitions structures with their data
for unanimity and majority game.
4.3.1 Case where payoff is determined without transfers
The number of stable, internally, inter-coalitionally and externally stable coali-
tion structures in the open, exclusive majority and exclusive unanimity
membership game are given in table 4
Table 4
Results 6 region case Finus-Eyckmans
OPENM EXMMAJ EXMUNAN
Stable 0 4 7
Internally Stable 11 11 11
Intercoalitionally Stable 2 120 152
Externally Stable 54 102 150
In the open membership game only the Grand Coalition and the coalition
structure with all members singletons are Inter-Coalitionally stable.
Table 5. Least Non-Stable Coalition Structure, No Transfers, Open Membership
Number Coalition Structure ∆l =
∑3
i=1∆
i
cl
29 {USA; JPN; ROW} {EU; CHN; FSU} -98.26
In the following figures non-stability indicators are illustrated. The y axis of
the figure represents the value of the indicator and the x axis the number of
the coalition structure.
Figure 1 shows a case where Finus and Eykmans [4] do not apply transfers in
21
an open membership game. The least non-stable coalition structure, number
29 in table 5, is the coalition structure that requires least total compensation
for individual regions (in this case) not to leave one of the coalitions. Figure 2
shows results for the same case where a majority voting rule is applied. Stable
coalition structures appear. In the figure they are marked as structures 49,
51, 198 and 199 (see appendix A). The stability indicator of these coalition
structures fall exactly in the zero x-axis.
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Figure 1. Non-stability indicators. Case No Transfers: Open Membership Game
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Figure 2. Non-stability indicators. Case No Transfers: Majority Game
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4.3.2 Case where payoff is determined with transfers
Finus and Eyckmans elaborate another case where the payoff of the individual
regions within a coalition is determined by sharing the benefits of the coalition
in a certain way, according to a so-called transfer rule. We use the data of
the resulting payoff matrix for determining stable coalition structures. The
number of stable, internally, inter-coalitionally and externally stable coalition
structures in the open, exclusive majority and exclusive unanimity
membership game are given in table 6. One can observe that use of transfers
Table 6
Results 6 region case Finus-Eyckmans with Transfers
OPENM EXMMAJ EXMUNAN
Stable 0 5 5
Internally Stable 35 35 35
Intercoalitionally Stable 4 90 90
Externally Stable 68 91 91
may lead to more stable coalition structures.
The least non-stable coalition structure in the Open Membership Game is:
Table 7. Least Non-Stable Coalition Structure, Transfers, Open Membership
Number Coalition Structure ∆l =
∑3
i=1∆
i
cl
133 {USA; CHN} {JPN; FSU} {EU; ROW} -29.07
A table with the stable structures can be found in the appendix. For the
description and interpretation of the stable structures see [4].
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4.4 Implementation Aspects
All results are obtained using a simple processor Pentium IV. The imple-
mentation procedures are written in Matlab. The main program, run.m, call
sequentially to the other subprograms, representing each of one part of the
algorithm. The subprograms are:
• step 1 of the algorithm: settings
• step 2 of the algorithm: generate
• step 3 of the algorithm: abatement
• step 4 of the algorithm: stability
The original Matlab code was translated to Fortran code with the aim to
speed-up calculation and improve memory use. The total CPU times obtained
with the Fortran code are displayed in table 8:
Table 8
CPU Times of data processing
6 regions 8 regions 10 regions 12 regions
Cases StaCo Model [7]
Total Number of Coalition Structures 203 4.140 115.975 4.213.597
CPU Times Per Case (Seconds)
Majority Voting 0,016 0,500 29,312 1.987,078
Exclusive Memb. Game
Unanimity Voting 0,016 0,484 28,516 1.953,750
Open Membership Game 0,001 0,453 27,594 1.894,641
The table shows the development of the total number of coalition structures
and the time to process them when the number of regions increases from 6 to
12.
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5 Conclusions
The concept of the multiple coalition game as outlined in among others [3],
[4], [5] and [11], has been defined in an exact way. The new vector notation
and neighbourhood notation allows implementation in an algorithmic context.
The results of our implementation coincide what has been found in an earlier
study (Finus & Eyckmans [[4]]) with 6 regions. Our implementation provides
the feasibility to study a multiple coalition game with 12 regions within 1.950
seconds (approx. 1/2 hour).
The research in this paper shows how by mathematically redefining concepts,
computer coding has been facilitated that made it possible to generate relevant
results for such a huge case. To our knowledge, empirical results for such large
cases were not reported before in the theory of coalition formation.
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A Appendix 1: Finus - Eyckmans stable coalition structures
Table A.1
Majority Game: No Transfers
Non-singleton Coalition {USA,JPN} {EU,ROW}
Welfare 78639.741 + 43048.671 103131.988 + 81182.549
Singleton Coalitions CHN FSU
Welfare 9175.922 23910.032
World 339088,903
Non-singleton Coalition {USA, ROW}
Welfare 78600.713 + 81219.556
Singleton Coalitions JPN EU CHN FSU
Welfare 43034.755 103094.343 9172.367 23896.640
World 339018,374
Non-singleton Coalition {USA,JPN} {FSU,ROW}
Welfare 78563.437 + 43012.936 23869.687 + 81261.914
Singleton Coalitions EU CHN
Welfare 103032.233 9167.649
World 338907,856
Non-singleton Coalition {JPN,ROW}
Welfare 43009.414 + 81245.427
Singleton Coalitions USA EU CHN FSU
Welfare 78560.760 103024.030 9166.958 23875.586
World 338882,175
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Table A.2
Unanimity Game: No Transfers
Non-singleton Coalition {USA,FSU,ROW}
Welfare 78643,359 + 23898,355 + 81200,181
Singleton Coalitions JPN EU CHN
Welfare 43056,722 103158,638 9177,722
World 339134,977
Non-singleton Coalition {USA,JPN,ROW}
Welfare 78635,362 + 43049,961 + 81180,319
Singleton Coalitions EU CHN FSU
Welfare 103149,841 9177,001 23912,676
World 339105,16
Non-singleton Coalition {USA,JPN} {EU,ROW}
Welfare 78639,741 + 43048,671 103131,988 + 81182,549
Singleton Coalitions CHN FSU
Welfare 9175,922 23910,032
World 339088,903
Non-singleton Coalition {JPN,FSU,ROW}
Welfare 43031,200 + 23882,409 + 81235,884
Singleton Coalitions USA EU CHN
Welfare 78607,735 103090,042 9172,303
World 339019,573
Non-singleton Coalition {USA,ROW}
Welfare 78600,713 + 81219,556
Singleton Coalitions JPN EU CHN FSU
Welfare 43034,755 103094,343 9172,367 23896,640
World 339018,374
Non-singleton Coalition {USA,JPN} {FSU,ROW}
Welfare 78563,437 + 43012,936 23869,687 + 81261,914
Singleton Coalitions EU CHN
Welfare 103032,233 9167,649
World 338907,856
Non-singleton Coalition {JPN,ROW}
Welfare 43009,414 + 81245,427
Singleton Coalitions USA EU CHN FSU
Welfare 78560,760 103024,030 9166,958 23875,586
World 338882,175
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Table A.3
Majority and Unanimity Game: Transfers
Non-singleton Coalition {USA,ROW} {EU,CHN}
Welfare 78552,913 + 81453,237 103163,670 + 9187,516
Singleton Coalitions JPN FSU
Welfare 43082,561 23938,224
World 339378,121
Non-singleton Coalition {JPN,CHN} {EU,ROW}
Welfare 43054,689 + 9181,829 102988,511 + 81424,765
Singleton Coalitions USA FSU
Welfare 78687,395 23928,538
World 339265,727
Non-singleton Coalition {EU,CHN} {FSU,ROW}
Welfare 103096,241 + 9180,089 23847,647 + 81405,256
Singleton Coalitions USA JPN
Welfare 78661,292 43058,973
World 339249,498
Non-singleton Coalition {JPN,ROW} {EU,CHN}
Welfare 42996,960 + 81390,804 103092,776 + 9179,701
Singleton Coalitions USA FSU
Welfare 78658,543 23915,769
World 339234,553
Non-singleton Coalition {USA,EU} {CHN,ROW}
Welfare 78592,325 + 103068,831 9157,986 + 81315,745
Singleton Coalitions JPN FSU
Welfare 43031,480 23888,088
World 339054,555
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